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Abstract
Over the last decades, transparency has featured prominently among the European Union’s (EU) efforts to democratize
and legitimize its governance. This shift toward transparency has taken many forms and, as the contributions to this the-
matic issue show, these different forms have evolved significantly over time. Yet, initiatives to enhance transparency have
often been blamed for limiting the efficiency of the decision-making process or leading to suboptimal policy outcomes.
Consequently, the debate has shifted to whether transparency would be excessive in that it would undermine the EU’s
capacity to deliver through political arrangements. This editorial presents this transparency–efficiency dilemma, which the
different contributions to this thematic issue analyse further.
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1. Introduction
Democracy has been the elephant in the room of
the European integration project since its inception.
Challengers to the qualification of the European Union
(EU) as democratic underline both institutional issues,
revolving around the lack of accountability of the insti-
tutions, and substantive gaps. As the latter is in particu-
lar due to the absence of a demos for which remedies
are elusive, the EU has overwhelmingly relied on institu-
tional change to address its democratic deficit and fos-
ter its democratic ideal. At the same time, the underpin-
nings of EU democracy have considerably evolved over
time, even to the extent of forging ad hoc conceptions
of a notion that was thought to be the stronghold of
modern polities (‘constraining dissensus’ and ‘through-
put legitimacy’ being notionswhich emerged in thewake
of the integration project). Over the last decades, a
push towardmore transparency has featured prominent-
ly among the initiatives to enhance the democratic legiti-
macy of the EU. Commonly defined as allowing citizens to
scrutinize all information uponwhich decisions aremade,
transparency is at the heart of throughput legitimacy as
the only concept that invariably appears in all its defini-
tions (see e.g., Geeraart, 2014; Iusmen & Boswell, 2017;
Schmidt, 2013). Step-by-step, different initiatives were
hence taken at the supranational level to disclose infor-
mation and ‘open up’ the institutions. This “turn towards
transparency” (Bianchi & Peters, 2013) has taken many
forms and, as the contributions to the thematic issue
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show, these different forms have evolved significantly
over time.
Yet, initiatives to enhance transparency have been
found to further influence the efficiency of the decision-
making process or lead to suboptimal policy outcomes.
Transparency is indeed sometimes blamed for slowing
the decision-making process and even for hampering
its success. There are several reasons underlying this
argument. First, when transparency is the rule, decision-
makers may refrain from changing position in the course
of negotiations and become inflexible, notably when
they receive a clear (and sometimes binding) negotiat-
ingmandate from their principal whomay thus blame, or
even sanction them if they deviate from it (Elster, 2015).
Second, by revealing who the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’
of negotiation are, transparency increases the cost of
defeat. Those on the losing side may be tempted to
block decisions or to adopt strategies to conceal their
defeat by joining the majority at the last minute, as
observed by Novak (2013) in the case of the EU Council
of Ministers. Even when transparency and openness do
not necessarily create a hurdle to the success of the
decision-making process, the argument goes that it cre-
ates a disadvantage for the parties engaged in such
a collective decision. To disclose one’s preferences or
negotiating strategy beforehand is indeed likely to weak-
en one’s position, even though it has also been evi-
denced that greater transparency contributes to increas-
ing the EU’s bargaining leverage in international trade
negotiations (Heldt, 2020). Third, political actors act-
ing under public scrutiny are compelled to avoid the
familiarity and informality which is deemed to facilitate
compromises (Fasone & Lupo, 2015). Last but not least,
transparency can fuel increased politicization of policy
issues which makes decision-making and implementa-
tion more difficult (De Bièvre, Costa, Garcia-Duran, &
Eliasson, 2020). In other words, from an output legitima-
cy perspective, there might be desirable limits to trans-
parency (Alloa, 2017). As such, the transparency–secrecy
dilemma has largely come to epitomise the democratic–
efficient dilemma. As a consequence, the debate has
shifted to whether transparency would be excessive
in that it would undermine the EU’s almost legendary
capacity to deliver through political arrangements. This
thematic issue delves into this dilemma.
2. Outline of the Thematic Issue
The EU transparency initiatives are indeed often present-
ed as among themost advanced in the world. Elaborated
with the explicit aim to act against the common percep-
tion of the supranational political systemas being distant,
technocratic, undemocratic, and even impenetrable, the
push toward more transparency was meant to restore
accountability and ultimately public trust. Most of the
existing literature on transparency has either explored
the measures taken to make information on the legisla-
tive process more open, or built on its foreseen negative
effect on efficiency (Héritier & Reh, 2012). Some recent
studies suggest that major actors are still able to rein-
troduce informality through the backdoor, controlling
whether they dispatch information or not, and circum-
venting the regulation (Coremans, 2019). This thematic
issue builds on this perspective, studying the reaction of
institutional actors to the transparency imperatives. The
central question addressed by the contributions is: What
are the effects of openness and transparency arrange-
ments on the political actors’ attitudes and behaviours?
As Fung, Graham, and Weil (2007, p. 51) argue, trans-
parency measures aim at steering the behaviour of
actors and institutions in ways policy-makers believe will
advance the public interest. As such, while some trans-
parency measures may fail to alter behaviours because
few actors act on the information generated through
the different initiatives, some measures may indeed
result in the expected behavioural change. This themat-
ic issue examines the concrete practices of institutions
and actors. With different contributions, we hope to pro-
vide insight into how and why transparency is ‘captured’
by institutions and political actors, how it is used, and
what potential it has in terms of making the EU more
democratic and accountable. To do so, the thematic issue
brings together six articles and two commentaries.
The first article by Caby and Frehen (2021) allows us
to situate transparency in the wider concern of (through-
put) legitimacy, which is nothing less than the raison
d’être of the notion. As they note, previous conceptuali-
sations of throughput legitimacy invariably include trans-
parency as one of the concept’s dimensions. Within the
field, transparency is found to be part of a cluster that
deals with how principles are translated into actions
within various international organisations, very much in
line with this thematic issue’s assumption that the focus
is now on how actors produce legitimacy and seize its
principles. EU studies is also confirmed as a primary sub-
field (in line with Steffek, 2019).
Subsequent articles delve into transparency develop-
ments in reference to specific instruments, actors, and
fora. A key instrument to enhance transparency is the
EU Transparency Register which emerged out of the
European Transparency Initiative and which is discussed
in the second contribution by Dinan (2021). It aims to
make public which organizations and persons engage
with the EU institutions in the policy-making process in
order to empower media, civil society, and citizens to
scrutinize the conduct of EU officials and to see whether
decisions have been influenced in any way by specific
interests which do not reflect the public interest. This is
possibly an important transparency instrument to steer
the behaviour of EU officials. In his contribution, Dinan
describes and analyses the emergence, development,
and use of the transparency register and identifies sever-
al shortcomings to the current approach especially with
regard to reaching the general public,media, and citizens.
Dinan finds that the current approach results in a register
that is mostly used by professionals and lobbyists “clus-
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tered around the European quarter in Brussels” (Dinan,
2021, p. X) and engaged in European public affairs. As a
result, the ability of media and other actors to use the
register and hold officials to account is significantly ham-
pered. Dinan offers some insights and recommendations
to address these concerns.
Sooner or later, the debate on EU transparency
almost invariably stumbles on the trilogues as informal
meetings wheremost inter-institutional negotiations are
still secretly concluded nowadays, remote from any
oversight, except feedback from the negotiators them-
selves. The third article by Pennetreau and Laloux (2021)
addresses this issue empirically by considering the extent
towhich European Parliament (EP) rapporteurs are being
(un)transparent in their speeches when reporting to the
assembly’s plenary on the legislative compromise they
reach through trilogues negotiations. Their investigation
is thus a perfect example of looking at transparency in
the process. While the plenary speeches are supposed
to make up for the intrinsically untransparent nature of
trilogues, they evidence that not only is transparency
modest but that its degree depends on both the political
affiliation and national culture of the rapporteur rather
than on political conflicts within the institution or in the
inter-institutional arena. In other words, transparency is
not particularly prompted by politicisation and political
conflicts. Overall, the EP has hence rather failed to deliv-
er on the transparency promise made by the foreseen
compensating mechanisms.
In analysing the effects of openness and transparen-
cy on attitudes and behaviours of the actors involved it is
also relevant to dig into specific policy areas. The fourth
contribution by Marx and Van der Loo (2021) focuses on
trade policy, which for the last two decades has been
under contestation of citizen and civil society actors for
being opaque and secret. As a response, the European
Commission has put transparency at the forefront of its
trade policy as one of its foundational principles, rec-
ognizing the importance of transparency for the legit-
imacy of trade policy. Their article focuses specifically
on the negotiation and implementation of a free-trade
agreement. Transparency in the context of free-trade
agreements relates to different parts of the trade pol-
icy process. On the input side, it enables stakeholders
to participate in the development of trade agreements
and insert different preferences. On the output side,
transparency is relevant for holding the actors involved
to account for the implementation of the trade agree-
ment. The article shows that the Commission has gone a
long way to make the process of negotiating trade agree-
ments much more transparent and in this way enabling
the inclusion of different preferences in the negotiation
of trade agreements. They are more sceptical about the
progress made with regard to the implementation of
trade agreements.
The fifth article by Bodson (2021) turns attention to
the role of the judiciary. Indeed, transparency in the EU—
as well as at other levels of governance—cannot rely
exclusively on the willingness of the decision-makers to
be open and, in particular, to provide access to their files.
Judicial institutions can and do play a key role in improv-
ing the openness of government and, as such, in shap-
ing the democratic architecture of the political system.
As highlighted by Bodson’s article, this is precisely what
was at stake for the EU with the De Capitani v. European
Parliament and the ClientEarth v. European Commission
cases, through which the EU Court of Justice ruled in
favour of more transparency and openness by imposing
the disclosure of internal documents linked to the EU
legislative process. However, the capacity of the Court
to force transparency is inherently limited as it must act
within the remits of the Treaties and the EU primary
and secondary laws. What is more, Bodson argues that
‘access’ as implemented by the Court has to be assessed
in light of the risk of the perverse effects of ‘excess.’
By fixing the borders of transparency, the decisions of
the Court may indeed encourage the institutions to shift
decision-making away from the formal arenas to infor-
mal ones: This is precisely the contrary of what trans-
parency activists wish for.
The final article by Gijsenbergh (2021) focuses on
a specific type of actors in the transparency debate,
namely whistle-blowers. The progress of transparen-
cy may ultimately depend on initiatives of individuals
and groups who challenge the institutions to be more
open and accountable. This is precisely Gijsenbergh’s
argument, in his analysis of three whistle-blowers who,
over the last 60 years, have had a major impact on
how European politicians and officials feel about trans-
parency. By disclosing confidential documents to expose
wrongdoings and corruption, these whistle-blowers not
only forced transparency upon EU institutions, but also
provoked debates about the (il)legitimacy of secrecy and
the democratic value of openness. The circumstantiat-
ed historical recount of these whistleblowing episodes
contributes to demonstrating that recent developments
in the EU policy of transparency—notably in the form
of the 2019 Directive on the protection of persons who
report breaches of Union law—is the culmination of
an incremental shift in how democracy is perceived
in Europe.
The commentary by Hillebrandt (2021) questions the
scope of the ‘access’ dimension as a fair prerequisite
to any consideration on whether transparency comes
in excess at the EU level. Asking whether transparen-
cy may continue to be reduced to access to documents
as the EU has restrictively typified it, Hillebrandt’s argu-
ment revolves around the changing context that almost
naturally facilitates such access. Access to documents is
argued to be a mile wide and an inch deep, in that many
features of the decision-making process itself remain
secluded, that the lay citizen is unlikely to find their way
toward such access and the latter is recurrently bypassed,
thus echoing the argument about there being a lack of
transparency in the process. As such, access to docu-
ments as the long-time carrier of the transparency ideal
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does not actually come in excess and has become, in part,
unfit for purpose.
The last contribution to the thematic issue takes a
more cautious and critical approach to the recent devel-
opments of the EU in terms of transparency. In his com-
mentary, Rebasti (2021) indeed ponders the implications
of the De Capitani case, also discussed in the contri-
bution by Bodson, for the broader EU model of repre-
sentative democracy. Echoing the theme of the difficult
balance between transparency and efficiency that runs
through the entire thematic issue, he contends that the
Court’s decision to open up the trilogue negotiations’
blackbox leaves many questions unanswered as to the
nature of the EU legislative process.
3. Conclusion
The thematic issue shows that the EU has taken a
number of initiatives to make its policy-making process
more transparent. Whether these efforts are sufficient
to increase the legitimacy of the policy-making process
and strengthen accountability mechanisms remains an
open question. In a landmark study, Fung et al. (2007)
found that many reforms and initiatives for more trans-
parency often generate irrelevant and incomprehensi-
ble information for stakeholders who cannot act upon
the disclosed information. They stressed the importance
for transparency measures to focus on the needs of cit-
izens. Conclusions of the articles collected in this the-
matic issue point in the same direction: Engaging and
involving citizens will be of crucial importance in order to
strengthen the legitimacy of the EU. Transparency mea-
sures can play an important role in this but they should
be designed appropriately and target citizens. This recon-
necting to citizens is also highlighted in the launch of the
Conference on the Future of Europewhichwill take place
in 2021 and 2022.
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